Ruling of the Italian Corte di Cassazione no. 13818 of 12 May 2026 establishes a principle of major practical importance for those seeking recognition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis who tried to book a consular appointment before 27 March 2025 without success. Consular backlogs and administrative blockages justify direct access to the courts. And citizenship iure sanguinis is reaffirmed as a permanent and imprescriptible subjective right existing from birth.
A lawyer’s perspective
For years, Italian courts have been divided on a fundamental procedural question: whether applicants seeking recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis were required to attempt the administrative route before turning to the courts. Some courts declared claims inadmissible on this basis. Others — including Bologna and Trieste — consistently held that, in the absence of an express statutory requirement, access to judicial proceedings could not be precluded for failure to try the administrative route first.
Order no. 13818/2026 goes a step further: it establishes that standing to sue exists even where the applicant was prevented from submitting a request at all, due to consular delays and blockages beyond their control.
This ruling may also prove relevant in light of what the Constitutional Court left open in judgment no. 63/2026. At paragraph 9.1, the Court explicitly acknowledged that it could not rule on the position of those who had tried to obtain a consular appointment but had not received one by 27 March 2025 — signalling that the question deserves examination. Order no. 13818/2026 provides the legal framework to argue that these applicants were not inactive: they were blocked by the administration itself. That argument is now supported by a clear principle of law from the Court of Cassation, and it will be central to proceedings in the months ahead.
The case: a Colombian family blocked by consular delays
The proceedings originated from an application filed with the Genoa Court by a group of descendants of an Italian citizen who had emigrated to Colombia, seeking recognition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis. The applicants had made repeated attempts to obtain an appointment at the Italian Embassy in Bogotá in order to submit their application through the administrative channel, but without result: the consulate was unresponsive, failed to schedule appointments, and had even published a notice on its website acknowledging that it was unable to resume citizenship-by-descent activities following the Covid-19 emergency.
Faced with this bureaucratic blockage, the applicants decided to go directly to the ordinary courts, bypassing the administrative route. The Genoa Court upheld the application.
The Ministry of the Interior appealed, arguing that the applicants lacked standing to sue because they had not submitted a valid administrative application before approaching the court. The Genoa Court of Appeal sided with the Ministry and declared the application inadmissible. The applicants then brought an appeal before the Court of Cassation.
The legal principle: consular delays justify recourse to the courts
The First Civil Section of the Court of Cassation, by order filed on 12 May 2026, upheld the first ground of appeal and quashed with referral the judgment of the Genoa Court of Appeal.
The legal principle laid down by the Court of Cassation establishes that standing to sue exists not only where there has been a refusal or delay in recognising citizenship status, but also where obstacles, difficulties or excessive delays prevent the applicant from even submitting the relevant request to the competent administration, since such a situation generates uncertainty as to the applicant’s status and the rights and prerogatives attached to it.
In other words: it is not necessary to have submitted a complete administrative application in order to bring court proceedings. It is sufficient to demonstrate that the administration made it impossible — or even extremely difficult — to take even the preliminary step of booking an appointment.
Why this principle matters for those who did not obtain an appointment by 27 March 2025
The 2025 reform preserved proceedings already initiated by 27 March 2025. Parliament, during the conversion of the decree into law, extended this protection to those who had already obtained a confirmed consular appointment by that date. But what happens to those who had tried to book an appointment without success, due to administrative blockages or the absence of any response from the consulate?
The Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 63/2026, explicitly acknowledged that it could not examine this question, while signalling that the difference in treatment may carry significant constitutional relevance.
Order no. 13818/2026 now provides a concrete legal tool for these individuals. If consular delays and blockages constitute an obstacle equivalent to a refusal, then those who were unable to obtain even an appointment cannot be treated as having been inactive or late. It was the administration that made it impossible for them to act — not their own choice.
Accordingly, these individuals may have the right to bring court proceedings by demonstrating that they made unsuccessful attempts to book a consular appointment before the deadline. Documentary evidence of those attempts — emails, screenshots of access to the consulate’s booking portal, formal requests — takes on strategic importance in this context.
Read also: Italian citizenship iure sanguinis, the Constitutional Court validates the 2025 reform — judgment no. 63/2026.
The nature of citizenship iure sanguinis: a permanent and imprescriptible right
The ruling reaffirms a principle already established in the case law of the Court of Cassation, but one that has taken on renewed relevance in light of the tension with Constitutional Court judgment no. 63/2026.
The Court of Cassation holds that in proceedings for the recognition of citizenship by descent, the administrative authority performs a purely declaratory function: it does not create a right, but merely acknowledges an absolute subjective right of primary constitutional importance that exists from the moment of the holder’s birth and is permanent and imprescriptible in nature.
This position runs counter to certain statements in judgment no. 63/2026, in which the Constitutional Court described citizenship not yet formally recognised as a precarious or virtual status, lacking concrete legal effects until formal recognition is obtained. The tension between the two courts is real and has direct practical consequences for thousands of pending proceedings.
Standing to sue: uncertainty as to status is sufficient
The Court of Cassation clarifies that in declaratory proceedings it is not necessary for a right to have already been infringed: an objective state of uncertainty as to the existence of the right is sufficient, provided it is concrete rather than merely hypothetical.
In iItalian citizenship-by-descent cases, this uncertainty already exists where the administration has not yet recognised the status — and all the more so where the administration has made it impossible to submit the application at all. The failure to recognise the right, or even an unreasonable delay in doing so, constitutes a detriment to the holder who, though already an Italian citizen in the Court of Cassation’s view, cannot exercise the rights and prerogatives attached to that status.
The Court also clarifies that standing to sue must be assessed at the time of the decision, not at the time the proceedings were commenced. This means the court must assess the situation as it stands at the date of its ruling, taking into account all legislative developments that have occurred in the interim — including the entry into force of Law no. 74/2025.
The facts: the Bogotá Embassy and the post-Covid blockage
In the case examined by the order, the applicants had documented their booking attempts through emails, records of access to the Embassy’s website, and a formal request for access to administrative documents. They had also produced the official notice published by the Bogotá Embassy in 2022, in which it openly acknowledged its inability to process new citizenship-by-descent requests and stated that no date had yet been set for the resumption of appointments.
The Court of Appeal had disregarded this evidence, finding that the applicants had not demonstrated submission of a valid application to the consular authority. The Court of Cassation considered this reasoning to be wrong: the obstacle placed by the administration in the way of the very possibility of submitting an application constitutes a situation equivalent to a refusal or delay in recognition, and as such justifies direct recourse to judicial protection.
What to do if you were on a consular waiting list
In light of order no. 13818/2026, those who were waiting for a consular appointment before 27 March 2025 without having obtained one should gather all available documentation evidencing their attempts to contact the consular administration:
- Emails or messages sent to the consulate requesting information or appointments.
- Screenshots showing access to the consulate’s online booking portal.
- Any automated replies or communications received from the consulate.
- Official consulate notices attesting to the suspension or blockage of the service.
- Formal requests for access to administrative documents submitted to the administration.
This documentation may be decisive in establishing standing to sue in any future proceedings, and in demonstrating that the failure to take formal steps by 27 March 2025 was due to circumstances beyond the applicant’s control.
Why this ruling matters beyond pre-decree cases
As a lawyer working daily on citizenship iure sanguinis cases, this is a point I find myself explaining constantly.
It is worth clarifying a point that is often misunderstood. Corte di Cassazione ruling no. 13818/2026 arises from proceedings initiated before the Tajani Decree, but its significance does not end there.
The starting point is one on which both courts actually agree: birth is the moment at which citizenship is acquired. Those born before 27 March 2025 were born under Law no. 91/1992. If at that moment they were already Italian citizens — as the Court of Cassation holds, describing the right as permanent and imprescriptible — then the new law affected an already-existing status, not a mere future expectation. Two very different legal characterisations, with very different consequences.
This does not mean the Constitutional Court was wrong in its reasoning. It means the debate is not closed: it has simply moved from the Constitutional Court to the ordinary courts.
The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutional legitimacy of the specific case before it, without its decision automatically binding all other cases. It is the Court of Cassation, through its subsequent rulings, that shapes the living law and determines how it applies in practice. Pursuing pending proceedings — including those initiated after the decree — is the only way to build a solid body of case law. This is not a new approach: it is exactly the path that led to the recognition of citizenship transmitted through the maternal line.
Those who argue that everything is now settled do not understand how law is made in practice. The ordinary courts and the Court of Cassation still have much to say.
Frequently asked questions: Court of Cassation ruling no. 13818/2026 and Italian citizenship iure sanguinis
What is the core principle established by Cassation ruling no. 13818/2026?
The First Civil Section of the Court of Cassation established that standing to sue for recognition of Italian citizenship iure sanguinis exists not only where the administration has refused or delayed a request, but also where obstacles, difficulties or excessive delays have prevented the applicant from even submitting the request in the first place. The key point is that the applicant’s inability to act must be caused by the administration itself — for example, by failing to provide appointments or by suspending the service entirely. In those circumstances, the applicant cannot be treated as having been inactive, and direct recourse to the courts is permitted.
How does the Court of Cassation define the nature of citizenship iure sanguinis?
The Court of Cassation reaffirms a principle consolidated in its case law over decades: citizenship by descent is an absolute subjective right of primary constitutional importance that exists from the moment of the holder’s birth. It is permanent and imprescriptible — meaning it does not expire and cannot be lost through inaction. The role of the administration in these proceedings is purely declaratory: it acknowledges a right that already exists, rather than creating a new legal status. This is why, in the Cassation’s view, the failure to obtain formal recognition does not mean the right does not exist.
What is the tension between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court?
The two courts have reached different conclusions on the same fundamental question: what is the legal nature of citizenship iure sanguinis before formal recognition? The Constitutional Court, in judgment no. 63/2026, described unrecognised citizenship as a precarious or virtual status lacking concrete legal effects until official recognition is obtained. The Court of Cassation, in ruling no. 13818/2026, holds instead that the right exists fully from birth, regardless of whether it has been formally acknowledged. This divergence is not merely academic: it has direct consequences for thousands of pending proceedings, and the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation have already been formally called upon to resolve it.
Can I still apply for recognition if I tried but failed to get a consular appointment before 27 March 2025?
This remains a legally open question. The 2025 reform formally protects those who had already obtained a confirmed consular appointment by 27 March 2025, but does not expressly address those who requested an appointment without receiving one. The Constitutional Court, at paragraph 9.1 of judgment no. 63/2026, explicitly acknowledged that it could not examine this question, describing it as extraneous to the case before it and leaving it open for future proceedings. Ruling no. 13818/2026 of the Court of Cassation provides a legal basis to argue that those who were prevented from booking an appointment by consular inefficiency were not inactive and retain the right to bring court proceedings. The outcome will depend on the specific facts of each case and the documentation available.
Is a formal administrative Consular refusal necessary to start court proceedings?
No. The Court of Cassation has clarified that it is not necessary to have submitted a complete administrative application before turning to the courts. What matters is that the applicant can demonstrate a concrete state of uncertainty as to their citizenship status — and that this uncertainty cannot be resolved without judicial intervention. Where the administration has made it impossible or extremely difficult to even take the preliminary step of booking an appointment, that situation is treated as equivalent to a refusal or unreasonable delay, and is sufficient to establish standing to sue.
What documentation do I need to prove I was blocked by a consulate?
The Court of Cassation examined a case in which the applicants produced emails sent to the consulate, records of access to the Embassy’s website, a formal request for access to administrative documents, and an official notice published by the Bogotá Embassy acknowledging that it was unable to process citizenship-by-descent requests and had no date for resuming appointments. The Court considered this documentation sufficient to demonstrate that the administration had rendered it impossible to submit a request. In practical terms, any dated and verifiable evidence of attempts to contact the consulate or book an appointment may be relevant: emails with delivery confirmation, screenshots of access to the booking portal, automated replies, and official consulate notices
Does the Tajani decree reform still apply?
Yes. The Constitutional Court has validated the 2025 reform, including its retroactive effects, with judgment no. 63/2026. The reform remains in force and has changed the rules for obtaining recognition of Italian citizenship by descent. However, the Constitutional Court also acknowledged that certain questions remain open — in particular, the position of those who were prevented from applying due to consular backlogs. The legal landscape is still evolving, with further hearings scheduled and the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation yet to rule on the fundamental question of the nature of the right.
Why is the Bogotá Embassy – May 2026 ruling of the Corte di Cassazione on Jure Sanguinis case significant?
The Bogotá Embassy case is significant because it provides a concrete example of how consular inefficiency can justify direct recourse to the courts. In that case, the Embassy had published an official notice on its website stating that it was unable to process new citizenship-by-descent requests following the Covid-19 emergency and had no date for resuming appointments. The applicants had made repeated attempts to obtain an appointment, all without success. The Court of Cassation held that this situation — where the administration had made it impossible to even submit a request — was equivalent to a refusal, and that the applicants therefore had standing to bring court proceedings directly. The principle applies beyond the specific facts of that case.
Who is protected under the safeguard clause of the italian citizenship law 2025 reform- Tajani decree?
The reform preserves the application of the previous legislation — and therefore the possibility of obtaining recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis under the old rules — for those who, by 27 March 2025, had already initiated judicial proceedings, submitted a complete administrative application at a consulate or municipality, or obtained a confirmed consular appointment. The last category was added by Parliament during the conversion of the decree into law. Those who fall within these categories can continue their proceedings under the rules in force before the reform, although the new provisions on the burden of proof may affect even these cases if interpreted as immediately applicable procedural rules.
What are the next steps for those in the grey area?
The legal debate has not been settled by the Constitutional Court’s judgment — it has moved to the ordinary courts. Ruling no. 13818/2026 of the Court of Cassation provides a concrete legal tool for those who were prevented from obtaining a consular appointment. The Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation are expected to rule on the fundamental question of whether citizenship iure sanguinis is a permanent right existing from birth or a right that produces effects only from the moment of formal recognition. That ruling will be decisive for thousands of pending proceedings. In the meantime, those who believe they fall within the grey area should gather all available documentation of their attempts to contact the consulate and seek a careful assessment of their specific situation.
